Scholarship on the history of European integration often points to the experience of and fight against the 'Nazi horror' as key catalysts for amplifying a sense of European solidarity and identity that in turn helped pave the way for the postwar movement towards European integration. 'The more plainly the totalitarian character, contempt for legality, and racial arrogance of Nazism were shown in action', the late Nestor of European integration history Walter Lipgens (1982: 46) writes, 'the more people came to their senses and returned to the true European tradition.' What has gone unnoticed in this extensive scholarship though, is the fact that a few decades prior to the Nazi collapse another 'true European tradition', namely 'racial arrogance' itself, helped galvanize European solidarity in the fight against another 'horror'. The perceived horror consisted of the tens of thousands of colonial troops deployed by France for the occupation of the German Rhineland following Germany's defeat in the First World War. Numerous leaders, popular movements and media outlets across Europe and beyond referred to this 'abomination' as the 'Black horror on the Rhine' (Nelson 1970; Lusane 2003; Wigger 2010) . In Mein Kampf (first published in 1925) Hitler spoke of the colonial troops in terms of 'the contamination by Negro blood on the Rhine in the heart of Europe […] bastardizing the European continent at its core' (quoted in Lusane 2003: 80) . Hitler was certainly in good company, similar opinions reaching well into Western Europe's liberal and social democratic establishments, as well as into prominent women's organizations (Nelson 1970; Lusane 2003 ).
For our purposes here, the most important aspect of the 'Black horror' relates to its place in the early modern history of European integration, commencing in the interwar period and culminating in the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which gave birth to the European Economic Community (i.e. today's European Union). As we will go on to demonstrate, by situating it in this context, the widespread fury unleashed by the presence of colonial troops in the 'heart of Europe' can serve as a wedge that discloses the intimate yet neglected bond between European integration, on the one side, and colonialism and African colonies in particular, on the other.
1 Indeed, from the interwar period up until the late 1950s practically all of the visions, movements and concrete institutional arrangements working towards European integration placed Africa's incorporation into the European enterprise as a central objective. As so much of the scholarly, political and journalistic accounts at the time testify to, European integration was inextricably bound up with a Eurafrican project. At the Hague Congress of Europe in 1948, for instance, it was proclaimed that 'The European Union must, of course, include in its orbit the extensions, dependencies and associated territories of the European Powers in Africa and elsewhere, and must preserve the existing constitutional ties which unite them. ' (quoted in Hick 1991a: 335-6) 2 Nine years later, French socialist premier Guy Mollet, upon the conclusion of the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community (EEC), stated as follows at a press conference in Washington DC:
I would like to insist upon the unity of Europe: it is now a fact. A few days ago we jumped over the last hurdles that were on its way, and now an even broader unity 1 For more on this neglected bond, see Muller (2000) and Moser (2000) . 2 The Congress of Europe in The Hague gathered some 750 delegates and political leaders (including Konrad Adenauer and Winston Churchill), representing various interests, movements and parties (excluding the communists and the far right). It was organized by the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity and gave birth to the European Movement and subsequently, in 1949, the Council of Europe.
is being born: EURAFRICA, a close association in which we will work together to promote progress, happiness and democracy in Africa. (Koller 2001: 87-102) . In the French troops that after the war continued the occupation of the Rhineland, there were between 20,000 and 45,000 of soldiers from Madagascar, West Africa, Morocco and Algeria (Lusane 2003: 72) .
The presence of non-white soldiers in the occupying forces bred strong emotions among the Germans and the wider European public and intelligentsia. African soldiers were generally perceived as unreliable savages, who posed great danger especially for the German female and juvenile population (Wigger 2010 Ebert's opinion was indeed shared by all political parties in Germany of the period, with the exception of communists and independent social democrats. Visual images of the period illustrate that Germany regarded the presence of black and coloured troops as a humiliation so shameful that it rocked at the very foundation of national identity. One poster from 1920 shows a happy-looking black man, all naked except for the helmet usually worn by French troops, standing like a huge colossus with his legs spread wide and his giant feet crushing the cross-framed houses of a German town, at the same time rubbing against his waist and sexual organ ivory-white female bodies that he has caught in his hands (Theweleit 2000 (Theweleit : 1001 . Yet another illustration is a commemorative coin, minted and sold to promote resistance against the French occupation. At one side of the coin is the facial profile of a black soldier, caricatured to look like a monkey, next to which are stamped the words "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité" and "Die Wacht am Rhein", "Guard on the Rhine." On the other side of the coin we see a woman tied to a tree, the trunk of which, at closer scrutiny, turns out to be an enormous erected penis.
Configurations of Eurafrica in the interwar period
In one sense, these statements and images are just a continuation of a long history of (Schwartz 1995: 95-6 This was the argument for civilization. In addition, the 1920s added a third, economic argument; for as Europeans compared their own states to the rapidly growing economies of the United States and the Soviet Union, they concluded that both enjoyed the advantage of being able to organize their economies on a continental scale, whereas
Europe was politically divided and suffered economically from numerous trade barriers.
This economic perspective then gradually turned into a geopolitical one, which touched the sensitive issue as to whether Europe would be able to regain its place as a dominant power on a par with the other ones. From this perspective, Africa was seen as a natural or necessary part of Europe's geopolitical sphere, a part that needed to be more strongly connected to Europe, and one that needed to be exploited by united European forces in order to be properly and adequately used. As the intellectuals of the 1920s argued in favour of a European union or federation, their arguments implicitly or explicitly addressed Africa. Europe could develop its fullest economic and political potential only through Africa.
Africa was mainly looked upon as a great provider of natural resources and agricultural produce, but also as a reservoir for hydroelectric power. Sometimes, Africa also was seen as the solution to Europe's demographic problems; it was widely agreed that Europe was overpopulated, and the continent would be greatly helped if surplus population could emigrate and settle in the 'empty' territory south of the Mediterranean.
As Coudenhove-Kalergi (1929: 3) stated in his essay 'Africa': 'Africa could provide Europe with raw materials for its industry, nutrition for its population, land for its overpopulation, labour for its unemployed, and markets for its products.'
What is important is that all these arguments for an assimilation of Africa into Europe then formed yet another strong argument for the unification of Europe. This argument won support especially in Germany, which, through an arrangement of this kind, would regain access to its former colonial territories that it had lost in the First World War (see e.g. Coudenhoven-Kalergi 1932: 7-11). Interwar politicians and intellectuals also gave a name to the new great power that would again raise the star of Europe. The geopolitical bloc was called Eurafrica, a notion so prevalent in these years that it is difficult, if not impossible to find out who actually coined it (see Ageron 1975 ).
Contrary to a common understanding and standard historiography of the roots of today's Top-ranking French politicians such as Paul Reynaud, minister of colonies, and Hubert Lyautey, former governor general of Morocco, argued that the European collaboration at the exposition must now be followed by a co-European collaboration in the colonies themselves, 'for which France was prepared' (Ageron 1975: 461 territories, which form part of it, should endeavour to speed up and increase the production of scarce materials.' (OEEC 1951: 20) Although formulated in less grandiose and utopian terms, the report echoes the interwar's plans for Eurafrica in its focus on large-scale infrastructural projects, water control, agriculture and 'constructional work, on a heavier scale'; e.g.: 'Vast stretches of mosquito-infested swamp must be drained.' (OEEC 1951: 21) What is more, the report is totally void of indications that colonialism in Africa might some day come to an end; on the contrary Eurafrican planning is unreservedly described as 'a long-term task' in an African terrain characterized by 'political security' (OEEC 1951: 72 (CE 1952: 154) For this project to become viable, obviously, West German, but also Scandinavian, capital and industrial clout was greatly sought after (CE 1952: 54-7; 175; 190) .
According to the expert report, all parties stood to gain from such a collaborative approach: 'If European countries without colonial responsibilities contribute to the development of overseas territories it will then be possible to open these overseas markets to them.' (CE 1952: 64) With limited access to its traditional markets in the east -now within the Soviet orbit of control -the report argued, such a scenario should provide West Germany, in particular, with an important incentive to look to Africa as an outlet for its 'tractors, cranes, bridges, dredges, machine tools, etc.' (CE 1952: 54) As during the interwar's Eurafrica debate, the topic of European emigration to Africa also figured prominently in the Strasbourg Plan, since 'over-population' still was seen as 'one of Europe's most critical human and social problems' (CE 1952: 58 Franco-German coal and steel agreement was but the first step in a process leading to a common exploitation of Africa's resources. Africa, argued Zischka (1951) in the title of his book, was 'Europas Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Nr. 1' ('Europe's number one common priority').
As we enter the period for the Rome Treaty negotiations (1955) (1956) (1957) Annex IV). As part of this, a European Development Fund was established (still in place today) to which all members contributed -West Germany and France being the largest providers -but from which, of course, French colonies by far benefitted the most. It deserves mention that, on the whole, the Treaty of Rome's colonial scheme was established without any prior consideration as to the opinions from within the territories to be subjected to incorporation or association (Heywood 1981: 210; Lynch 1997: 204) .
This arrangement, whereby the other members, in particular West Germany, collectively helped finance investments in France's African colonies in exchange for access to colonial markets was, from the perspective of Paris, nothing less than a sine qua non for the preservation and anticipated animation of its imperial enterprise in Africa, its Union française (the French Union) (see further Bossuat 1996: 320-355; Guillen 1992; Kent 1992; Lynch 1997; Migani 2008: 49-62; Muller 2000) .
If the Dutch government was the most opposed to the EEC's association schemedue, inter alia, to its fear of high costs and divergent views on trade policy, but also because of its reluctance of getting mixed up in France and Belgium's colonial projects and problems (Laurent 1972: 214; Lynch 1997: 204) -sentiments in West Germany were a bit more mixed (Lynch 1997: 204) . Within Adenauer's cabinet some important figures (among them the minister of economy, Ludwig Erhard) were vehemently against it and the social democratic opposition made it clear that if it was to endorse the Rome Treaty 'Germany should assume no responsibility for the colonial policies of the countries whose overseas territories were to be under EEC' (Haas 1958: 139, n48 ). This notwithstanding, Adenauer's clout and determination not to spoil an unprecedented opportunity for closer European integration carried the day.
But if the German government gave in to France's Eurafrican ultimatum, Adenauer's personal outlook was much in line with the general perspective from which Paris and other actors derived their plans for Eurafrican integration. Adenauer's motivation for European integration was primarily political and geopolitical; and it was a geopolitics to no little extent inspired by Coudenhove-Kalergi's interwar Pan-European movement (Schwartz 1997: 237-8) . Adenauer not only believed in the 'superiority of Western civilization'; he was equally convinced of the inherent racial inferiority of blacks. It was, therefore, inconceivable, as Adenauer phrased it, 'that Africa, as a black continent, could be independent alongside the other continents' (quoted in Schwartz 1997: 191) . He also firmly believed that '[t]he domination of the Mediterranean basin by the Soviet Russians would simply be the end for Europe. ' (quoted in Schwartz 1997: 190) To prevent this from happening, Adenauer deemed it necessary for the West to embark on a massive economic development of the southern Mediterranean and the adjacent Middle East, so as to fully incorporate these regions into Western Europe's sphere of interests (Schwartz 1997: 190-1; 373) .
During the Suez crisis Adenauer's European conviction would be strengthened further. As the unfolding world events were seen as posing a challenge to Europe's influence in global affairs, it had become all the more important for Europe to stake out its common geopolitical interests in a more independent fashion. 'Then, just as Coudenhove-Kalergi had said in his time', Hans-Peter Schwartz (1997: 238) notes, 'Adenauer spoke of the "appearance of non-white peoples on the political stage of world events"'. This, and its potential effects on the future constitution of the UN, Adenauer found to be deeply disturbing (Schwartz 1997: 254-5 ).
Adenauer's conviction concerning the need for a strong European power, built on a solid French-German partnership and more independent from the US, thus happened to solidify together with France's decision to make the realization of the EEC hinge on France and England will never be powers comparable to the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor Germany either. There remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world; that is to unite to make Europe. England is not ripe for it but the affair of Suez will help to prepare her spirits for it. We have no time to waste: Europe will be your revenge. In this context, too, the Eurafrican offer of EEC association may be interpreted as a divide and rule scheme, whereby the alleged African benefits of EEC association would thwart the Pan-African movement (Martin 1982) , attracting its moderates and isolating its radical and most committed leaders: foremost Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah and Guinea's Séko Touré. 4 As Nkrumah's had it, the Treaty of Rome and the EEC marked 'the advent of neo-colonialism in Africa ' (quoted in Martin 1982: 229) , whereby association represented a newfangled arrangement for 'collective colonialism which will be stronger and more dangerous than the old evils we are striving to liquidate' (quoted in Europe', this should also explain the rather sudden decline of Eurafrica during the 1960s. In many ways, then, the study of the rise and decline of Eurafrica in the postwar period becomes a study of the Cold War logic and ideology's rise to dominance.
However, and in line with Connelly's argument, the only way to conceive of this is precisely by decentering the Cold War as the dominant analytical framework. Otherwise the rich material pointing to alternative driving forces behind European integration becomes incomprehensible to us. Also, the radically different geopolitical designs for the postwar world order that was encoded in the idea of Eurafrica will then remain at best a peculiar historical anecdote, unworthy of further consideration. As we have shown, Eurafrica was far more than that.
We have traced the contours of a political, intellectual and academic discourse that played a considerable role in the debates on European integration and its institutional formation in the inter-and postwar periods. According to this discourse, a future European community was inseparable from a common and unified colonization of Africa. There is strong evidence to support that these ideas were instrumental in the actual, diplomatic and political constitution of the EU, or of Europe as a political subject, although we must save the detailed demonstration of this for a later time. If our thesis is true, the origins of the EU cannot be separated from the perceived necessity to preserve and prolong the colonial system. We all know that the inequality that obtains still today between Europe and Africa has a history; but few have explored the role that the EU -and European integration more generally -has played in it. And the essentials remain as they were then: at least on the political level. Just as self-evident that the EU should feel free to do as it pleases to prevent African migrants from entering Europe, just as self-evident it is that the EU feels the right to enter Africa. Let us finish, then, with a more contemporary reference. 
